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Post-Signing Adjustment Of SEP/FRAND Licenses 
 By Peter Georg Picht
Abstract: 
The question of whether, when and how SEP/FRAND 
licenses ought to be “adjusted” in the case of a post-sign-
ing alteration in the set of licensed patents is of increas-
ing practical relevance. Adjustment may be necessary to 
keep a license FRAND in the event of far reaching portfo-
lio alterations and several legal instruments could poten-
tially provide the basis for performing such adjustments, 
amongst them “adjustment clauses” which are integrated 
ex ante into the license contract or general principles of 
patent or competition law. On the other hand, the risk 
to generate continuous conflict between the parties 
cautions against making adjustment available too easily. 
This article maps the present legal framework regard-
ing license adjustment on the EU, as well as on certain 
parts of the Member State level. It highlights a selection 
of fundamental aspects that ought to be taken into con-
sideration for the development of appropriate solutions. 
Against this background, potential tools for and elements 
of such solutions are evaluated.
I. Introduction*
“Standard-essential” patents (SEPs) protect inventions which form part of a technical standard and which need to be used in order 
to implement the standard, for instance by producing 
standard based devices. Such patents are oftentimes 
subject to the “FRAND” licensing approach under 
which the patentee of a potential SEP declares—typ-
ically at the request of a standard-setting organisation 
(SSO)—that it is willing to license its patents at “fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory” conditions to im-
plementers of the standard in case these patents are or 
become standard-essential.1 According at least to the 
majority of courts and scholars,2 the patentee’s FRAND 
declaration does, however, not by itself establish a li-
cense contract3 between the patentee and a particular 
implementer. In any case, the 
FRAND declaration is neither 
meant nor sufficient to spell 
out the detailed conditions of 
such a license. Patentee and 
implementer need therefore 
to subsequently agree on the 
terms of a FRAND license and 
the road towards this agree-
ment can be a rocky one. For 
the European Union, the CJEU 
has, in its seminal decision 
Huawei v. ZTE (hereinafter: 
Huawei”),4 laid out a number of principles and “rules 
of conduct” on how patentee and implementer should 
behave in FRAND licensing negotiations.5 The Court 
was, however, rather tight-lipped regarding the neces-
sary content of a FRAND license and did not explain 
how the conditions of the license need to be shaped 
in order to “be FRAND.” Since Huawei, EU Member 
State courts are in the process of working out the details 
of the CJEU’s framework of conduct by deciding issues 
which the CJEU left unsolved.6 
One of these issues—as yet not much discussed in 
scholarly literature but of increasing prominence in 
practice—consists of the question whether, when and 
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1. For an overview of SSO licensing policies, see Bekkers, 
Updegrove, IPR Policies and Practices of a Representative 
Group of Standards–Setting Organizations Worldwide, 2013, 
https://www.nap.edu/resource/18510/Bekkers-Updegrove%20
Paper_092013.pdf.
2. LG Mannheim, 18 February 2011, 7 O 100/10; LG 
Düsseldorf, 24 April 2012, 4 b O 273/10; LG Düsseldorf, 
Mitt. 2012, 238—MPEG-2-Standard XXIII; LG Mannheim, 27. 
February 2009, 7 O 94/08—UMTS-fähiges Mobiltelefon; LG 
Mann-heim, 2 May 2012, 2 O 240/11; Kühnen, Handbuch der 
Patentverletzung, 9. Aufl. 2017, Kap. E Rdnr. 286; Haedicke, 
Lehren aus der Huawei v. Unwired Planet-Entscheidung für das 
deutsche Patentrecht, GRUR Int. 2017, 661, 669.
3. The UK decision Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC, HP-
2014-000005, 5 April 2017, paragraph 115 et seq., affirms a 
contractual nature of the FRAND commitment but denies that 
it has the effect of establishing a (detailed) license contract 
between the parties. Instead, the license is held to require 
another, subsequent contract.
4. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. und ZTE 
Deutschland GmbH (C-170/13) ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.
5. Huawei (Fn. 3), paragraph 55 et seq. See further e.g. Peter 
Picht, “The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts 
and issues post-Huawei,” European Competition Law Review 
37, no. 9 (2016): 365-75; Federich Romby, “The ECJ’s Huawei 
judgment on standard-essential patents: a step forward in the 
ongoing antitrust debate,” International Trade Law & Regulation 
22, no. 2 (2016): 42-46. 
6. Picht, “‘Frand wars 2.0’—Rechtsprechung im Anschluss 
an die Huawei/ZTE-Entscheidung des EuGH,” Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb WUW 2018 (to be published), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2916544; Picht, “Unwired 
Planet v Huawei: A Seminal SEP/FRAND decision from the UK,” 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 12, Issue 
10, 1 October 2017, p. 867–880, https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/
jpx152.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3164310 
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how SEP/FRAND licenses ought to be “adjusted” in 
case of an alteration in the set of licensed patents. An 
“alteration” may take the form of patent invalidation 
or, on the opposite, the confirmation of patent valid-
ity as a result of legal action; of patent expiration; of 
the acquisition of new patents covered by the license; 
or even of a change in the market value of particular 
patents. “Adjustment” can equally mean a variety of 
measures, such as an increase or decrease in royalties 
or the modification of other licensing terms. Several 
legal instruments could potentially provide the basis 
for performing such adjustments, amongst them “ad-
justment clauses” which are integrated ex ante into 
the license contract; general contractual principles on 
the ex-post modification of agreements; general prin-
ciples of patent or competition law; or even specific, 
more or less binding state law provisions embedded 
into patent, contract or competition law. 
The particular relevance of license adjustments to 
the SEP/FRAND area results from at least two factors: 
As SEP portfolios can be large and their licensing a 
crucial prerequisite for operating freely in lucrative, 
standards based markets, royalty payments to be 
made under SEP/FRAND licenses can add up to high 
amounts. Hence, there is much at stake for patentee 
and implementer alike and both sides may perceive 
license adjustment—depending on the direction it 
takes—as a tool for improving ex-post what they ne-
gotiated ex ante. Furthermore, with growing portfolio 
size, fluctuations in a SEP portfolio that raise the ques-
tion of adjustment become a more and more frequent, 
one might even say an inherent, occurrence. This is all 
the more so because standardization and SEP/FRAND 
licensing loom particularly large in the ICT7 sector, a 
sector for which short product, technology and stand-
ard life-cycles, intense patenting,8 substantial invalida-
tion activity (cf. below III.2.) and the transfer (not only 
the licensing) of patent portfolios9 are characteristic. 
As with other aspects of SEP/FRAND licensing, the 
narratives regarding license adjustment differ10 as 
profoundly as might be expected in a field that dis-
plays fierce antagonism between the involved market 
players. Are implementers the ones to be pitied—and 
rescued by way of license adjustment—because they 
are continuously forced into licensing, at excessive 
prices, “SEP” portfolios which contain mostly non-es-
sential and/or invalid patents? Is it, on the contrary, 
urgent to save patentees from attempts to adjust SEP/
FRAND licenses because adjustment would consti-
tute yet another way to systematically deprive them 
of a fair remuneration for their R&D activity, as well as 
their contributions to standard-setting? Is the ex-post 
adjustment of licenses a necessary or an impractica-
ble component in the attempt to create a SEP/FRAND 
licensing environment that is fair, facilitates business 
and sets the appropriate incentives to innovate? 
The present article aims at taking a closer look at 
these intricate questions, bridging the gap between 
practical relevance and academic analysis regarding 
SEP/FRAND license adjustments. It sets out by map-
ping the present legal framework regarding license ad-
justment on the EU as well as on certain parts of the 
Member State level (II.). The analysis then turns to a 
(non-conclusive) selection of fundamental aspects that 
ought to be taken into consideration for the develop-
ment of appropriate solutions to the adjustment issue 
(III.). Against this background, potential tools for and 
elements of such solutions are evaluated (IV.).
II. Present Legal Framework
1. Statutory Law
a) EU Level
Although voluminous, the EU body of statutory law 
dealing with IP licensing does not contain any spe-
cific rules on adjustment. In particular, the Enforce-
ment Directive,11 the Horizontal Guidelines,12 and 
the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation 
(TT-BER)13 with its corresponding Guidelines14 are si-
lent on this point. Since the TT-BER is arguably the 
regulation most relevant for competition law com-
pliant SEP licensing and since the Horizontal Guide-
lines contain an entire section on the appropriate 7. Information and communication technologies.
8. On characteristics of the ICT sector, see e.g. Comino, Maria 
Manenti, JRC Science and Policy Report: Intellectual Property 
and Innovation in Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT), http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/
JRC97541/jrc97541.pdf.
9. On partial portfolio transfers, see for instance Picht, 
“‘Frand wars 2.0’—Rechtsprechung im Anschluss an die Hua-
wei/ZTE-Entscheidung des EuGH,” https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2916544.
10. They are summarized very concisely in the recent 
Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential 
Patents, 29.11.2017, COM(2017) 712 final (hereinafter also: 
Commission Communication SEP), 2.
11. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (Enforcement Directive) [2004] OJ L157/45.
12. Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
to horizontal co-operation agreements (Horizontal Guide-lines) 
[2011] OJ C11/01.
13. Commission Regulation 316/2014 on the application of 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer 
agreements (Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation) 
[2014] OJ L93/17.
14. Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty 
to technology transfer agreements (TT-BER Guidelines) [2014] 
OJ C89/3.
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set up for SSOs and their standard-setting activity,15 
their silence can be taken to mean that EU law has—
so far—not felt the need to establish a principle of 
or rules on license adjustment. This assessment is 
corroborated by the EU Commission’s Communica-
tion on standard-essential patents, published in No-
vember 2017.16 Although the Commission sets out 
various principles for the FRAND licensing of SEPs, 
post-signing adjustment is not among them and no 
word is said on the issue. 
Some specific EU provisions may be of indirect 
relevance; however, paragraph 187 of the TT-BER 
Guidelines, in particular, states that the parties to 
a license contract can normally agree to extend roy-
alty obligations beyond the period of validity of the 
licensed intellectual property rights without falling 
foul of Article 101(1) of the EU Treaty.17 This is be-
cause, once these rights expire, third parties can 
legally exploit the technology in question and com-
pete with the parties to the agreement. Such actual 
and potential competition will, according to the EU 
Commission, normally be sufficient to ensure that 
the obligation in question does not have appreciable 
anti-competitive effects. With regard to the present 
context, paragraph 187 TT-BER Guidelines implicitly 
confirms that a license contract is not in violation of 
EU competition law just because it contains no ad-
justment clause, even though the absence of such a 
clause may result in royalty payments for invalidated 
or expired patents. 
b) Member State Level
This article cannot provide a comprehensive report 
on pertinent EU Member State law. At least in some 
important Member States, though, the legal frame-
work is similar to the EU level in its lack of explic-
it legislation on adjustment. It differs, however, in 
the existence of a legal tradition that applies general 
contractual rules to license adjustment scenarios 
and thereby develops, over time, a more or less de-
tailed set of guiding principles on the matter. 
German patent law, for instance, contains no explic-
it provisions dealing with license adjustment but it 
does feature contract law rules permitting to adapt 
an agreement to subsequent, material changes in rel-
evant circumstances even though the agreement it-
self contains no adjustment clause. The “frustration 
of contract” doctrine (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrund-
lage, § 313 German Civil Code) serves as the main 
contractual tool for an ex-post adjustment of licens-
es.18 § 313 German Civil Code sets the “frustration” 
threshold rather high, requiring that it would be un-
bearable (“unzumutbar”) for the licensee to perform 
the contract as originally stipulated.19 Patent licens-
ing case-law outside the SEP/FRAND context finds a 
“frustration” mainly where the only licensed patent 
is not granted or invalidated.20 
2. Selected Case Law
a) Ottung and Genentech
The look at paragraph 187 TT-BER Guidelines has 
indicated that license contracts obliging the licensee 
to continue the payment of royalties even after the 
licensed patent is no longer in force deserve com-
petition law attention but that such contracts can 
be compliant with EU competition law provisions, in 
particular with Article 101 TFEU. This finding is cor-
roborated by EU case law.21 In its Ottung decision22 
the CJEU addressed a situation in which the licensed 
patent expired after the conclusion of the license 
agreement. The Court held (paragraph 11) that
“[t]he possibility cannot be ruled out that the 
reason for the inclusion in a licensing agreement 
of a clause imposing an obligation to pay royalty 
may be unconnected with a patent. Such a clause 
15. Horizontal Guidelines, paragraphs 257-335.
16. Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential 
Patents, 29.11.2017, COM(2017) 712 final.
17. Cf. Pfaff, Osterrieth, Kap. 22 Rn. 127 on the policy change 
this involves vis-à-vis the previous version of the Guidelines.
18. Uhlmann, Deichfuß § 15 PatG, N 194 in “Beck`sche 
Kurzkommentare, Band 4, Patentgesetz, Gebrauchsmustergesetz, 
Patentkostengesetz,” ed. Georg Benkard (München: C.H. Beck, 
2015); Groß, Patentlizenzverträge (Frankfurt am Main: dfv 
Mediengruppe 2016), N 72; Henn, Patent- und Know-how-
Lizenzvertrag: Handbuch für die Praxis (Heidelberg_ Mül-
ler 2003), N 248; Oliver Axster, § 20, 21 GWB, N 155 in 
“Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und Europäisches 
Kartellrecht: Gemeinschaftskommentar,” ed. Christian Hootz 
(Köln: Heymann 2006); Pfaff/Osterrieth, Kap. 22 Rn. 127.
19. Uhlmann, Deichfuß § 15 PatG, N 194 in “Beck`sche 
Kurzkommentare, Band 4, Patentgesetz, Gebrauchsmustergesetz, 
Patentkostengesetz,” ed. Georg Benkard (München: C.H. Beck, 
2015); Michael Groß, Patentlizenzverträge(Frankfurt am Main: 
dfv Mediengruppe 2016), N 72; Günter Henn, Patent- und 
Know-how-Lizenzvertrag: Handbuch für die Praxis (Heidelberg_ 
Müller 2003), N 248; Oliver Axster, § 20, 21 GWB, N 155 in 
“Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und Europäisches 
Kartellrecht: Gemeinschaftskommentar,” ed. Christian Hootz 
(Köln: Heymann 2006).
20. BGH, GRUR 1957, 595, 596—Verwandlungstisch; 1961, 
466, 468—Gewinderollkopf.
21. U.S. courts, on the contrary, are very critical towards 
license contracts requiring post-expiration/invalidation royalty 
payments; cf. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) at 33: 
“[…] a patentee’s use of royalty agreement that protects beyond 
the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”; Kimble v. 
Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401.
22. Kai Ottung v Klee & Weilbach A/S and Thomas Schmidt 
A/S (C-320/87) ECLI:EU:C:1989:195.
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may instead reflect a commercial assessment of 
the value to be attributed to the possibilities of 
exploitation granted by the licensing agreement. 
[…] Where the obligation to pay royalty was en-
tered into for an indeterminate period and thus 
purports to bind the licensee even after the ex-
piry of the patent concerned, the question arises 
whether, having regard to the economic and legal 
context of the licensing agreement, the obliga-
tion to continue to pay royalty might constitute 
a restriction of competition of the kind referred 
to in Article [101](1).” [… It may] infringe Arti-
cle 101(1) TFEU where the licence agreement 
either does not grant the licensee the right to 
terminate the agreement by giving reasonable 
notice or seeks to restrict the licensee’s freedom 
of action after termination.”
In Genentech,23 the CJEU had to decide not on patent 
expiration but on the revocation of a licensed patent. 
In line with Ottung the Court held (paragraph 40) that 
“Article 101(1) TFEU does not prohibit the im-
position of a contractual requirement providing 
for payment of a royalty for the exclusive use of a 
technology that is no longer covered by a patent, 
on condition that the licensee is free to termi-
nate the contract.”
b) The Huawei Case
The Huawei ruling remains silent on the adjustment 
of SEP/FRAND licenses granted in a de jure stand-
ardization24 context. Even where it discusses—and 
affirms—the right of a licensee to challenge infringe-
ment, validity or standard-essentiality of licensed pat-
ents after the conclusion of the license contract,25 it 
does not suggest adjustment of the license contract 
following a successful challenge. The CJEU’s cau-
tion aligns well with its general approach of avoiding 
statements on the content of a FRAND license, fo-
cussing instead on the negotiation process that leads 
up to the agreement on a license. Helpful as some 
guidance regarding the substantive element—as op-
posed to the procedural element26—of FRAND may 
have been, there is also wisdom in the CJEU’s reti-
cence. Given the particularities of each case and the 
environment of rapid economic and technological 
change characteristic for ICT standard-setting, it is 
difficult for a high-level court as the CJEU to define 
detailed rules which prove appropriate for an en-
tire gamut of potential constellations. At least until 
lower courts have accumulated more experience in 
defining FRAND for particular cases it seems indeed 
sound to rely on “recognised commercial practices 
in the field”27—meaning also: on the working of the 
market,—to trust in the ability of parties, bound by 
the duty to negotiate cooperatively and in good faith, 
to work things out themselves, and to impose court 
ordered FRAND conditions only where the reliance 
on party independence and market process fails. 
This “non-interventionist” approach chosen by the 
CJEU in general advocates caution regarding the par-
ticular aspect of license adjustment as well. 
c) Post-Huawei Case Law
In the vast majority of post-Huawei decisions issued 
by Member State courts license adjustment is not 
mentioned at all. This is in itself an important find-
ing because it suggests that adjustment clauses or 
other contractual adjustment mechanisms do not 
(yet) form a recognized commercial practice in the 
field of SEP/FRAND licensing.
Two exceptions stand out, however: The Düssel-
dorf Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) 
held—however only in a guidance order (Hinweis-
beschluss)—that 
“furthermore a FRAND offer arguably requires 
that an adjustment clause be integrated into the 
license contract which allows for a royalty mod-
ification (in both directions) in case of noticea-
ble alterations in the licensed portfolio. As far 
as claimant points to the fact that the standard 
license contract is limited to a duration of three 
years, it has, so far, not been shown that this 
removes the need for an adjustment clause: It 
has not been documented that such a limited 
duration compensates for noticeable portfolio 
alterations in the same way as an adjustment 
clause.28 […]”
23. Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH and Sanofi-Aventis 
Deutschland GmbH (C-567/14) ECLI:EU:C:2016:526.
24. Regarding a de facto-standard, the German Federal 
Supreme Court, 6 May 2009, KZR 39/06, paragraph 32, held 
that the patentee does not have to accept a clause reserving 
the right to challenge. This may be taken to imply that, in the 
Court’s view, license arrangements can, in a de facto-setting, 
be protected more strongly from subsequent alterations 
(challenges) or modifications (adjustment). 
25. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. und ZTE Deutschland 
GmbH (C-170/13) ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, paragraph 69.
26. The fact that FRAND encompasses not only the conditions 
of a license but also the conduct in the negotiations regarding 
these conditions has been pointed out in particular by Unwired 
Planet v Huawei, EWHC, HP-2014-000005, 5 April 2017; cf. 
Picht, “Unwired Planet v Huawei: A Seminal SEP/FRAND 
decision from the UK,” Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice, Volume 12, Issue 10, 1 October 2017, p. 867–880, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpx152.
27. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. und ZTE Deutschland 
GmbH (C-170/13) ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, paragraph 65.
28. Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, 17 November 2016, 
I-15 U 66/15, paragraph 32.
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If claimant does not integrate an adjustment 
clause into its offer it has to justify why this is 
not necessary. The non-integration of a clause on 
adjustment in the event of patent (family) expi-
ration might be FRAND compliant only if it con-
forms to recognised commercial practice in the 
field, if the offered license contract is of short 
duration and if the overall royalty for the entire 
contract duration is FRAND because it appropri-
ately prices in the expiration of patents during 
the period the license contract is in force.29
Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technol-
ogies Co Ltd (hereinafter: Unwired Planet),30 as yet 
the most important UK decision on SEP/FRAND li-
censing, also discusses adjustment aspect, although 
not as detailed and comprehensively as the Düssel-
dorf decision. Regarding the determination of coun-
try-by-country royalty rates based on the number 
of declared SEPs in each country, the High Court 
held that 
“[a]ny declared SEP […] which is determined 
by a relevant court to be invalid or not essential 
would cease to count as a declared SEP. This is 
a simple way of ensuring that the licensee can, 
if they wish, challenge validity (etc.) while the 
agreement is in force. If further declared SEPs 
are added then again appropriate adjustments can 
be made.”31 
3. Some Take Aways
As the law stands, it contains some elements of an 
answer to our core question of whether, when and 
how license adjustment is required. Other important 
aspects of the question remain, however, open.
Neither have, in particular, contractual adjustment 
clauses been declared strictly mandatory nor their 
omission clearly anticompetitive. On the contrary, 
paragraph 187 TT-BER Guidelines, Ottung and Genen-
tech permit even the non-adjusted continuation of a 
licensing relationship post expiration/invalidation. This 
finding is quite important since patent expiration and 
patent invalidation are key instances for SEP portfo-
lio alterations. However, Ottung, Genentech and the 
Guidelines require that the licensee be given a right 
to terminate the license contract and, indeed, termi-
nation and renegotiation can serve as an alternative 
to the adjustment of a contract that remains in force. 
Although the findings in this line of cases are certainly 
of value for the assessment of SEP/FRAND licenses, 
their direct and unmodified application to such licens-
es is, however, doubtful. Neither Ottung nor Genen-
tech deal with large portfolios and the standardization 
context. A—simplified—formula declaring “if one pat-
ent lapses, go on paying as before or terminate the 
contract” is unlikely to provide the best solution for 
the SEP/FRAND world. Such a formula would render 
license contracts very unstable in an environment of 
fluctuating portfolios and it could force implementers 
out of the respective standards based markets once 
they decide to terminate the license contract as they 
remain, even after the lapse of one licensed patent, 
likely to violate another of the many SEPs previously 
licensed under the now terminated contract. 
The Huawei decision’s contribution to the issue is 
rather a non-interventionist general tendency that 
relies, for defining details of the FRAND concept, on 
“recognized commercial practice” in the market rather 
than on theoretical concepts. The Düsseldorf Higher 
Regional Court, however, has made a detailed state-
ment on which part of the coming discussion about 
license adjustment is likely to focus. Essentially, the 
Court says that (1) contractual adjustment mechanisms 
can be a necessary tool to handle post-signing portfolio 
fluctuations, even if the duration of the license con-
tract does not exceed three years; that (2) non-adjust-
ment is, however, acceptable if it corresponds to rec-
ognized commercial practice, at least where the port-
folio alteration is caused by patent expirations which 
are already priced in ex ante; that (3) adjustment ought 
to be triggered only by “noticeable” portfolio altera-
tions; and that (4) adjustment must be a bidirectional 
business, allowing also for conditions more favourable 
to the patentee in case the portfolio’s value increas-
es. The Court’s position leaves open, however, open 
a number of questions. It is, for instance, not clear 
whether a potential adjustment requirement follows 
from contractual or from competition law principles 
and—related to this aspect—whether parties are free 
to consensually exclude for their license agreement 
any adjustment whatsoever. The Unwired Planet de-
cision confirms the bidirectional nature of an appro-
priate adjustment regime. Furthermore, the decision 
points out that adjustability may generate an incentive 
to challenge licensed patents. Obviously, these court 
decisions raise a number of follow-up on questions—
what really is the recognized commercial practice re-
garding adjustment? Is it appropriate and in line with 
the European case law to distinguish between patent 
expiration and the invalidation of licensed patents al-
though a certain invalidation rate may also be priced 
into the licensing conditions? How can the noticeability 
threshold be specified more precisely? Regarding Ger-
man law, another open question is the relation of the 
29. Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, 17 November 2016, 
I-15 U 66/15, paragraph 43.
30. Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC, HP-2014-000005, 5 
April 2017.
31. Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC, HP-2014-000005, 5 
April 2017, paragraph 588.
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“unbearable” threshold stemming from § 313 German 
Civil Code and the “noticeable” threshold envisaged by 
the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court. Is noticeability 
a contractual threshold integrated either explicitly or 
implicitly into the SEP/FRAND license contract while 
unbearability constitutes a statutory law threshold that 
is always applicable but reached only where portfolio 
alterations go beyond mere noticeability? 
III. Fundamental Considerations
The task of answering these questions and working 
out an appropriate adjustment regime ought to be ful-
filled with a view to general principles that help to or-
der SEP/FRAND licensing. 
1. A Balanced SEP/FRAND Licensing System
Prominently among them ranks the awareness that 
the SEP/FRAND system has to secure the legitimate 
interests of patentees and implementers alike.32 As it 
forms part of the—all in all beneficial—activity of IP 
licensing and as it is an important pillar in the archi-
tecture of standards-based markets, a legal framework 
for SEP/FRAND licensing must aim at keeping this 
mechanism workable and attractive to stakeholders. 
Implementers need to be protected in their freedom 
to operate by acquiring and maintaining—in spite of 
portfolio alterations—the right to use the necessary 
SEPs at FRAND conditions. At the same time, paten-
tees need protection from hold-out practices, trying to 
use while evading compensation for the innovations 
made by others. When it comes to controversial ele-
ments of this framework, all sides are likely to point to 
dynamic33 efficiency and their respective incentives to 
invest and innovate. It is very hard to correctly predict 
and weigh such effects. But there is a good chance that 
a balanced approach yields the best results. And last 
but not least, a balanced framework is more than just a 
pious hope since the CJEU considers it a legal require-
ment under the TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.34 
2. Adjustment—Requirement to Keep a 
License FRAND?
A SEP/FRAND license needs to be FRAND, not only 
at the outset when the license is negotiated and agreed 
upon but also throughout the timespan it is in force. 
This follows, arguably, not only from the appropriate 
interpretation of a typical FRAND declaration but also 
from EU competition law. Assuming that a particular 
license was FRAND when signed by the parties, any 
post-signing alteration in the set of licensed patents 
suggests, at first sight, that the licensing conditions—
royalties in particular—need adjustment since they 
are no longer a FRAND compliant reflection of the 
economic and legal realities, i.e. of the number and 
value of the licensed patents.35 At a closer look, how-
ever, things are more complicated. 
The typical36 SEP/FRAND agreement is neither draft-
ed nor meant to license a fixed set of, say, a thousand 
patents that the patentee holds at a particular point in 
time. In the interest of both parties it aims, instead, at 
covering all present and future SEPs the patentee holds 
or acquires with regard to a particular standard. Tech-
nical standards evolve over time, dropping elements 
that have proven unsuccessful or that are no longer 
needed and integrating new components as technol-
ogy progresses. Patents on standard relevant technol-
ogy can, therefore, adopt or loose essentiality to the 
standard. Furthermore, it is likely, sometimes almost 
certain, that the licensor will register or otherwise ac-
quire (e.g. by way of transfer) additional SEPs. A fixed 
set approach could therefore hardly protect a licen-
see from infringing on some of the licensors’ patents 
and provide the stable, secure environment for doing 
standard-based business. 
The openness of the licensed portfolio and the in-
herence of alterations to this portfolio are bound to 
have an impact on licensing conditions. To the extent 
these conditions are set with a view to future fluctu-
ations in the number of relevant patents they neces-
sarily contain an element of estimation, accounting for 
the uncertainty regarding details of such fluctuations. 
A second element of uncertainty may stem from fluc-
tuations not in the number but in the value of the 
licensed patents. If, for instance, a patent covers a 
successful new product or if it is upheld in court, its 
market value will tend to go up. If, on the other hand, 
a patent-based product is no longer successful in the 
market or if one member of a multi-national patent 
family is invalidated by the courts of the respective na-
tional jurisdiction, patent value will tend to go down. 
Such value fluctuations may not be as clear-cut as fluc-
tuations in the number of licensed patents. However, 
as FRAND includes the concept of fairly reflecting the 
value of the licensed patents,37 they ought, in princi-
ple, to impact FRAND licensing conditions as well. 32. Cf. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. und 
ZTE Deutschland GmbH (C-170/13) ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, 
paragraph 42; Commission Communication SEP, 1 seq.
33. On the concepts of static and dynamic competition in 
general, see Schmidt, The suitability of the more economic 
ap-proach for competition policy: dynamic vs. static efficiency, 
E.C.L.R. 2007, 28(7), 408-411.
34. Cf. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. und 
ZTE Deutschland GmbH (C-170/13) ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, 
paragraph 42.
35. This seems to be the tendency in Hauck/Kamlah, Was 
ist “FRAND?” Inhaltliche Fragen zu kartellrechtlichen Zwangsli-
zenzen nach Huawei/ZTE, GRUR Int. 2016, 420, 425. 
36. Cf. Commission Communication SEP, 7, 10 seq., on the 
appropriateness of SEP portfolio licenses as opposed to a patent-
by-patent licensing.
37. See, paragraph 284, 289 Horizontal Guidelines w.f.r.
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Fluctuations of number or value in the licensed port-
folio can, theoretically, be reflected by the post-signing 
adjustment of licensing conditions. Where portfolio 
size, license duration and fluctuation rate are limited 
this may perhaps even be put into practice. The longer a 
license is intended to run, though, the larger the size of 
the licensed portfolio and the more frequent (therefore) 
fluctuations become, the less practicable continuous 
adjustments of conditions appear. They would tend to 
transfer the license from a reliable basis for commercial 
activity into a never-ending construction site requesting 
ever new resources for assessing patents, negotiation 
over their value, etc. Parties are likely, therefore, to set 
stable licensing conditions, at least where SEP portfo-
lios are large. The conditions may account to a certain 
extent for fluctuations in the commercial value of the 
portfolio, in particular where royalties depend on the 
number and price of patent-based products sold by the 
licensee. But otherwise, post-signing fluctuations are 
oftentimes not addressed. This circumstance can be 
explained best by assuming that fluctuations and the 
incertitude regarding their extent are priced into the 
initial licensing conditions.38 
In a broader sense, licensing terms often have to in-
clude a probabilistic element, in correspondence with 
the probabilistic nature of the subject they are dealing 
with. Looking only at ex post certitude regarding va-
lidity or value of particular patents would neglect the 
profound ex ante-uncertainty about patent strength 
shared by both parties. Importantly, this goes for sub-
sequent patent invalidations as well. Academic re-
search on the percentage of “vulnerable” patents—i.e. 
patents prone to invalidation—in a typical SEP portfo-
lio has yielded differing results.39 Safe it seems to say, 
nonetheless, that a sizeable SEP portfolio is likely to 
contain a non-negligible amount of vulnerable patents 
while also containing a non-negligible amount of strong 
and certainly standard-essential patents. Whatever this 
may tell about the quality of patent approval proce-
dures and a greater need for mechanisms that verify 
standard-essentiality of declared SEPs, it is a scenario 
under which parties can and do set licensing condi-
tions that account for both the vulnerable patents and 
the patents that certainly have to be used in order to 
implement the respective standard at all. 
Given that patent licensing has been going on for 
decades and has, overall, proven to be a workable 
mechanism, it seems fair to assume that parties can 
jointly deal even with a high degree of uncertainty re-
garding the content and development of a SEP portfo-
lio. Not always will the pricing in of uncertainties work 
well, for instance where alterations are both unfore-
seen and disruptive in their magnitude or where the 
level of information available to the negotiating parties 
is very unequal.40 Absent such extraordinary circum-
stances, however, conditions that appropriately price 
in subsequent portfolio alterations, thereby providing 
stability and allowing for intense, standards-based mar-
ket activity are in the interest of both parties as well as 
in the common interest—they are FRAND.
3. Chilling Challenges and the Viability of the 
SEP/FRAND System 
There is truth to the argument that non-adjustment 
can have a chilling effect on challenges against li-
censed patents since it takes away, to a certain extent, 
the economic incentive of reducing royalties by way 
of a successful challenge.41 However, this point may 
be carried too far by implying that more challenging is 
always better and that the potentially chilling impact of 
a relatively restrictive adjustment regime must reduce 
challenging activity below an optimal level. Legal peace 
and stable conditions for doing business are important 
advantages from a legal, economic and social point of 
view. They would suffer if the hope for easily available 
adjustment added yet another layer to the existing in-
court and out-of-court struggles over FRAND license 
agreements. Trying to justify a scenario in which con-
tinuous adjustment negotiations and adjustment liti-
gation divert ever more resources from the core busi-
ness activities of the players involved one may point to 
the—as such—beneficial effect42 that challenges may 
destroy weak patents which ought not to have been 
granted in the first place. This is, however, only part of 
the story. Since appropriate adjustment must go both 
ways, a substantial part of adjustment activity is likely 
to come from patentees pointing to SEPs which are 
new in the portfolio or have experienced an increase in 
value. In a substantial part of these cases, no weeding 
out of bad patents can be expected. 
Subtle economic analysis may be able to precisely 
balance the advantages (e.g. destruction of weak pat-38. Cf. also Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, 17 November 
2016, I-15 U 66/15, paragraph 43, acknowledging the pricing-in 
of expirations during the term of the license agreement.
39. See, for instance, Henkel, Zischka, Why most patents 
are invalid—Extent, reasons, and potential remedies of patent 
invalidity, https://www.tim.wi.tum.de/fileadmin/w00bcy/www/
Research/Publications/Henkel/Henkel_Zischka_Patent_Validity.
pdf; Kühnen, Claessen, Die Durchsetzung von Patenten in der 
EU—Standortbestimmung vor Einführung des europäi-schen 
Patentgerichts, GRUR 2013, 592, 594; Hess, Müller-Stoy, 
Wintermeier, MittdtPatA 2014, 439.
40. Cf., for instance, Commission Communication SEP, 3, on 
the particular difficulties start-ups and SMEs may face. 
41. Hauck/Kamlah, Was ist “FRAND?” Inhaltliche Fragen zu 
kartellrechtlichen Zwangslizenzen nach Huawei/ZTE, GRUR Int. 
2016, 420, 424; arguably along the same lines Unwired Planet v 
Huawei, EWHC, HP-2014-000005, 5 April 2017, paragraph 588.
42. Cf. recital (15), Article 5 paragraph 1 b) Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation; paragraph 133 et seq. TT-
BER Guide-lines.
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ents, lower royalty costs to be passed on to consumers) 
and disadvantages (e.g. higher transaction and litiga-
tion costs, higher royalty costs for patents subsequent-
ly added to the portfolio, economic uncertainty for the 
parties leading to a potential loss in dynamic efficien-
cy) of post-signing challenges and to come up with a 
truly optimal challenging level. Until this is achieved, 
though, the experiences with pre-signing disputes 
over the conclusion and the content of SEP/FRAND 
licenses advise against the careless creation of new op-
portunities for disagreement.
EU (case) law has already demonstrated its willing-
ness to establish and enforce a workable legal frame-
work that induces peaceful and effective licensing, 
even if some trade-offs have to be accepted in order to 
achieve this goal. The TT-BER Guidelines, for instance, 
are rather lenient towards no-challenge clauses if such 
clauses form part of a license agreement established by 
way of a settlement between the parties.43 Hence, the 
EU Commission accepts contractual mechanisms stabi-
lizing the contract the parties settled for even though 
these mechanisms limit the right to challenge. With its 
conduct requirements for a licensing negotiation pro-
cess the CJEU’s Huawei decision aims at replacing liti-
gation enforced by party consented SEP/FRAND licens-
ing. As long as the parties agree, during this process, 
on a set of licensing conditions, the CJEU requires no 
neutral instance to check whether the agreed license 
terms really are FRAND. In a sense, that is, the Court 
favours negotiated peace over FRANDliness as defined 
by theoretical formulae. When sketching the road to-
wards a negotiated, stable business environment based 
on FRAND-compliant licensing conditions the CJEU 
did, most likely, not envisage contractual elements 
prone—as far reaching adjustment clauses are—to 
disrupt the achieved stability. In post Huawei case law, 
Member State Courts have, so far, been fairly critical 
towards a patent-per-patent approach44 according to 
which a SEP/FRAND license would define an exclusive 
list of (court tested) SEPs and attribute a fixed royalty 
to each of these patents. Instead, broad portfolio li-
censes seem to become the widely favoured solution.45 
As already explained, it is inherent to a portfolio ap-
proach to make and maintain a summary assessment 
of patent value and royalties instead of engaging in, 
as it were, a post-signing patent-by-patent approach as 
patents continue to enter or drop out of the portfolio. 
All these reflections suggest: Rules on the adjust-
ment of SEP/FRAND licenses should aim at workable 
compromises,46 even if they deviate somewhat from an 
optimal reflection of each licensed patent’s value in the 
licensing conditions at any given moment. A reasonable 
threshold must be made operational, allowing for ad-
justment only in the event of disruptive portfolio altera-
tions. Challenging patents in the portfolio would, in any 
case, remain possible even if adjustment were excluded 
altogether. And even if it will not lead to an adjustment, 
challenging can be attractive since the implementer is, 
after a successful challenge, free to use the previously 
patented technology even for uses not covered by the 
license. Furthermore, patents invalidated as the result 
of a challenge would be disregarded when parties recal-
culate royalties for a follow-on license. 
IV. Solutions?
1. Cornerstones for a Workable Adjustment Regime 
As discussed below, there may be several legal mech-
anisms to implement a workable adjustment regime. 
Each approach should, however, take into considera-
tion at least the following aspects: 
• If an adjustment friendly regime is chosen with 
regard to open portfolio licenses, adjustment 
must, in order to qualify as FRAND, be a bidirec-
tional mechanism, allowing also for modifications 
in favour of the patentee. In case of cross licensing 
the modifications in the portfolios of both parties 
may level out, thereby removing the need to actu-
ally adjust the licensing conditions.
• Of great importance is a threshold below which 
portfolio alterations trigger no adjustment at all. 
In our opinion at least, this threshold ought to 
be a restrictive one in order to foster the stabil-
ity of license agreements. Existing case law seems 
to corroborate this view (cf. above). For short term 
license contracts the need to adjust is even lower 
since parties can react to portfolio alterations in 
(the case of) a renewal of the contract, exchanging 
ex post modification by ex-ante business judgment. 
• If market developments such as 5G should in-
tensify the trend towards large portfolio licenses 
it may well be that portfolio fluctuations increase 
but instances in which alterations require adjust-
46. Cf. also Commission Communication SEP, 6 seq., 
stressing efficiency considerations and the role of transaction 
costs in SEP licensing.
43. Paragraph 242 et seq. TT-BER Guidelines. Cf. also 
paragraphs 174, 178 TT-BER Guidelines: positive effects may 
justify even restrictive licensing contracts under Article 101 
paragraph 3 TFEU.
44. LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14—Saint 
Lawrence/Vodafone, Rn. 263; LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 
4a O 126/14—Saint Lawrence/Vodafone, Rn. 257. 
45. LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14—Saint 
Lawrence/Vodafone, Rn. 294; LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 4a 
O 126/14—Saint Lawrence/Vodafone, Rn. 288; LG Mannheim, 
8 January 2016, 7 O 96/14—Pioneer/Acer, Rn. 119, 132 f.; LG 
Mannheim, 27 November 2015, 2 O 106/14—Saint Lawrence/
Deutsche Telekom, Rn. 220; Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC, 
HP-2014-000005, 5 April 2017, paragraph 535 et seq.
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ment decrease as the overall portfolio value and 
structure is less affected by individual fluctuations. 
• Although further empirical research is needed 
on this point, it may well be that market sensitive 
adjustment thresholds adapted to the particulari-
ties of their respective market are preferable over 
a one size fits all approach.47 
• Existing (Member State) law on and mecha-
nisms for the expost adjustment of licenses must 
not be disregarded but, on the contrary, must be 
relied upon as far as it can effectively do the job. It 
is much better to adapt, where necessary, existing 
patent (licensing) law to the particularities of the 
SEP/FRAND environment than to create a body 
of “law apart” for these matters, an exercise that 
would, in all likelihood, lead to severe tensions 
between general and SEP/FRAND specific patent 
(licensing) law. This is not to mean that (EU) com-
petition law has no role to play. But it should step 
in only when and where patent law proves unable 
to work out procompetitive, FRANDly solutions. 
• Party autonomy should, in principle, be respect-
ed even if parties mutually agree to explicitly ex-
clude post-signing adjustment. Given that after 
Huawei both parties—in particular the patentee 
seeking an injunction—are obliged to offer and 
accept FRAND conditions lest they be defeated in 
court, such an agreement will, in most cases, not 
be the result of pressure exercised by one party 
but of a shared interest of both parties. 
• Claiming adjustment should not become an easy 
way to evade one’s obligations under the license 
contract. A party that chooses to ask or even lit-
igate for adjustment must therefore continue to 
honour these obligations, be it by paying royalties 
or by not interfering with the use of the licensed 
patents. In particular circumstances, for instance 
where the licensee is in danger not to receive back 
royalty payments once a retroactive downward ad-
justment of the royalty rate has taken place, or the 
patentee may risk not receiving the additional pay-
ment for newly acquired SEPs, payments into an 
escrow account can be an option. 
2. Potential Legal Tools
Among the legal tools with which the adjustment 
issue could be handled, detailed and binding regula-
tory or legislative intervention seems premature at 
present, given the early stage of case law and aca-
demic discussion. 
Parties to a license contract are in the best position 
to shape—where necessary—a case sensitive, suita-
ble adjustment regime48 along the lines of the “cor-
nerstones” formulated above.49 This remains true even 
where competition law may suggest the integration of 
an adjustment mechanism into a license contract since 
general competition law principles must still be trans-
lated into case-by-case solutions. The level of detail of 
such contractual solutions may vary and parties may 
choose between different types of clauses. For instance, 
parties may opt for long contract durations in combina-
tion with a post-signing adjustment mechanism or they 
may prefer a medium term contract, allowing for ad-
justments in the process of (re) negotiating conditions 
for a subsequent license term. Furthermore, parties 
may select between the cooperative working out of a 
potential adjustment, a unilateral right to terminate 
the license, and a unilateral determination of adjust-
ed conditions that is, however, subject to good faith 
and, if necessary, court controlled (§ 315 BGB).50 Very 
detailed clauses may appear attractive at first but it 
can prove tricky to capture all possible developments. 
To give only a few examples: Can a first instance in-
validation trigger adjustment or only a final decision? 
How to deal with a partial revocation or confirmation, 
potentially extending to only one/some member(s) of 
a patent family? How to effectively and reliably value 
patents that are subsequently added to the portfolio? 
Very unspecific clauses, on the other hand, may lead 
to frequent conflict over whether the broad terms of 
the clause are met or not. One middle ground option 
47. Cf. Pfaff/Osterrieth, Kap. 22 Rn. 133, stating that in 
cross-border licensing royalty adjustments are usually linked 
not directly to the invalidation of a licensed right but to losses 
in market share; the impact of patent invalidation on market 
share loss will, however, not be the same in all markets. The 
great importance attributed to—necessarily market-specific—
Comparables in the determination of SEP/FRAND licensing 
conditions also shows that such conditions ought to be set with 
regard to the particular market at issue. On the relevance of 
Comparables, see e.g. paragraph 284 Horizontal Guidelines; 
Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC, HP-2014-000005, 5 April 
2017, paragraph 175 et seq.; LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 
4a O 73/14—Saint Lawrence/Vodafone, Rn. 225 ff., 230 ff.; LG 
Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 4a O 126/14—Saint Lawrence/
Vodafone, Rn. 219 ff., 224 ff.
48. Cf. again Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, 17 November 
2016, I-15 U 66/15, paragraph 32, assuming a contractual solution. 
49. Cf. also Commission Communication SEP, 6, emphasizing 
that “the parties are best placed to arrive at a common 
understanding of what are fair licensing conditions and fair 
rates, through good faith negotiations.”
50. Several German courts have expressed a favourable 
view on using § 315 German Civil Code in the context of SEP/
FRAND licensing, see LG Mannheim, 27 November 2015, 2 
O 106/14—Saint Lawrence/Deutsche Telekom, Rn. 227; LG 
Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14—Saint Lawrence/
Vodafone, Rn. 282 ff.; LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 4a O 
126/14—Saint Lawrence/Vodafone, Rn. 276 ff.; from the pre-
Huawei case-law, see for instance OLG Karlsruhe, 27 February 
2012, 6 U 136/11.
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could lie in the definition of an alteration threshold the 
crossing of which triggers adjustment, together with a 
methodology that an independent third party should 
apply in adjusting the license conditions. 
Where the terms of an individual contract fail to 
provide a (complete) answer, general rules on license 
contracts—such as the “frustration of contract” doc-
trine (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, § 313 German 
Civil Code)—can, in principle, be applied if keyed to 
the particularities of a SEP/FRAND environment. This 
helps to keep the SEP/FRAND licensing rules connect-
ed to general patent law and, thereby, to foster consist-
ency of the patent system. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the form of medi-
ation and arbitration is still an exception but seems to 
be increasingly used for SEP/FRAND disputes,51 offer-
ing an additional road towards solving adjustment is-
sues. Parties may, in particular, profit from this oppor-
tunity by contractually establishing ADR mechanisms 
as a way to resolve adjustment issues. The proposition 
of a workable ADR mechanism in cases of noticeable 
alterations in the licensed portfolio could even be re-
garded as an indicator for the FRANDliness of a license 
offer, although this should not go so far as to make 
ADR willingness a mandatory component of a FRAND 
license (offer).52 If ADR fails, the courts in important 
patent venues, such as Great Britain, France, the Neth-
erlands or Germany, have much experience in dealing 
with license contract issues. And they have increasing 
experience regarding the particularities of SEP/FRAND 
settings. There is reason to hope that courts and ADR 
institutions can—over time and, hopefully, requiring 
only a limited amount of litigation—establish sound 
rules on adjustment where they are needed. Where 
this gradual process fails, however, regulators or the 
legislature ought to be ready to step in. ■
Available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN): 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3164310
52. Commission Communication SEP, 11.51. See, for instance, “Nokia receives decision in patent 
license arbitration with LG Electronics,” 18 September, 2017, 
https://www.nokia.com/en_int/news/releases/2017/09/18/nokia-
receives-decision-in-patent-license-arbitration-with-lg-electronics.
